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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The EU has set the most ambitious climate reduction targets in the world, with binding 
mechanisms already in place that guarantee a unilateral 20% greenhouse gas emission 
reduction by 2020 compared to 1990 levels. The EU is committed to increase this to a 30% 
reduction in the context of a fair and ambitious global agreement in Copenhagen, if other 
developed countries commit themselves to comparable reductions, and if economically more 
advanced developing countries contribute adequately according to their responsibilities and 
respective capabilities. But action by the EU alone is not enough. An effective deal in 
Copenhagen requires  
– ambitious cuts by all developed countries - and many need to step up their current pledges,  
– appropriate mitigation actions by developing countries, especially those that are 
economically more advanced, and  
– an effective global architecture to give the right incentives to galvanise investment into a 
low carbon economy. 
At the L'Aquila summit in July the Major Economies Forum (MEF), which includes key 
developing countries, recognised the scientific view that the increase in global average 
temperature ought not to exceed 2°C. The challenge in Copenhagen will be to translate this 
objective into concrete emission reduction targets. Science shows that this means a reduction 
of global emissions of at least 50 % compared to 1990 by 2050 and that global emissions need 
to peak by 2020. Science also shows that this means that developed countries need to have 
made cuts of 25-40% by 2020 and at least 80% by 2050.  
A deal on financing will be central to achieving an agreement at Copenhagen. UN 
negotiations are dangerously close to deadlock. Developed countries expect developing 
countries, especially the economically more advanced, to contribute to the overall effort. At 
the same time, developing countries want to see a clear position from developed countries on 
finance for mitigation and adaptation. With less than 90 days left before Copenhagen, the EU 
needs to re-take the initiative to enable the negotiations to move forward. 
This paper seeks to unlock the current impasse in the negotiations by presenting a blueprint on 
climate finance. In March 2009, the European Council made clear the EU's willingness to 
contribute a fair share to the global financial effort. The EU should now go one step further, 
and set out the likely sources of finance, how to define a fair contribution, and how to 
organise the financing. However, it should be understood that none of the figures in this paper 
represent formal EU proposals for commitments. They should be seen as indications of the 
order of magnitude of the finance that is likely to be needed in the event that Copenhagen 
achieves an ambitious outcome, with universal contributions from developed and 
economically more advanced developing countries, and a global carbon market that fully 
plays its role. 
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The European Parliament and the Council are invited to consider the following key elements: 
– Based on the Commission's best estimate, finance requirements for adaptation and 
mitigation actions in developing countries could reach roughly € 100 billion per year by 
2020. Domestic finance (public and private) in developing countries, the global carbon 
market and complementary international public financial flows should all play a role in 
meeting these requirements. Domestic private and public finance could deliver between 
20-40 %, the carbon market up to around 40 %, and international public finance could 
contribute to cover the remainder. The more ambitious the overall agreement is in terms of 
mitigation, the more it will require financial support from developed countries to the 
developing world. At the same time, more ambitious and widespread cap and trade systems 
will also generate more resources for mitigation activities in developing countries;  
– The international carbon market, if designed properly, will create an increasing financial 
flow to developing countries and could potentially deliver as much as € 38 billion per year 
in 2020. The Copenhagen agreement needs to establish a new sectoral carbon market 
crediting mechanism, while focussing the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) on 
Least Developed Countries. The EU should create an incentive for this transition under the 
EU Emissions Trading System;  
– Based on the Commission's best estimate, international public funding in the range of € 22 
to 50 billion per year should be made available in 2020. From 2013 public funding 
contributions should be shared out on the basis of ability to pay and responsibility for 
emissions and include economically more advanced developing countries. On the basis of 
these assumptions, the EU share would be from around 10% to around 30% depending on 
the weight given to these two criteria. In case of an ambitious outcome in Copenhagen, the 
EU's fair contribution could therefore be between € 2 to 15 billion per year in 2020 
depending on the overall size of the global financing agreed and the weight given to each 
distribution criterion; 
– Support to adaptation should give priority to the most vulnerable and poor developing 
countries; 
– International aviation and maritime transport can provide an important source of 
innovative financing, and should be further explored; 
– Governance of the future international financial architecture should be decentralised and 
bottom-up. It must also be transparent, allow for effective monitoring, and should respect 
agreed standards for aid effectiveness. A new High-level Forum on International Climate 
Finance should monitor and regularly review gaps and imbalances in financing mitigation 
and adaptation actions; 
– All countries, except LDCs, should prepare low-carbon growth plans by 2011, including 
credible mid-term and long-term objectives and prepare annual greenhouse gas inventories. 
The EU should present its own low-carbon growth plan for the period until 2050 by 2011. 
– Between 2010–2012, in the event of a successful agreement in Copenhagen, fast-start 
financing is likely to be needed for adaptation, mitigation, research and capacity building 
in developing countries in the range of € 5 to 7 billion per year. To this end, and on the 
basis of the above-mentioned assumptions, the EU should consider an immediate 
contribution of € 0.5 to 2.1 billion per year, starting in 2010. Both the EU budget and 
national budgets should be ready to contribute to this funding; 
– For the period after 2012, and as part of the package of proposals for the next financial 
framework the Commission would make a proposal for a single, global EU offer, including 
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whether to fund such an offer from 2013 within the budget, or whether to establish a 
separate Climate Fund, as part of the package of proposals for the financial framework 
post-2013, or a combination of the two. In the event of using the EU budget, a temporary 
solution for the year 2013, covered by the current financial framework, would also need to 
be proposed. Direct contributions from individual Member States could also form an 
important source of EU funding as part of the overall EU effort. The Commission's clear 
preference would be to use the EU budget, which would also allow the European 
Parliament to play its full role;  
– If the EU budget is not used, the sharing of contributions inside the EU should follow the 
same principles of contribution as the international level, taking into account the special 
circumstances of Member States. 
The scale of international public finance contributions would be significant but should not be 
exaggerated. For example, the scale of possible EU public finance contributions needed 
would be substantially smaller than the likely receipts to national budgets from auctioning 
revenues. Furthermore, fighting climate change is in general terms much less costly than 
dealing with its consequences. 
2. GENERATING ADEQUATE FINANCIAL FLOWS 
The scale of financial flows needed for adaptation and mitigation is estimated at around € 100 
billion per year by 20201. This sum is very often wrongly assumed to be the necessary 
contribution from public budgets of developed countries. There are a variety of different 
sources which can be expected to contribute: 
• domestic finance (public and private); 
• flows leveraged by the carbon market; 
• international public finance flows. 
Clearly the further development and expansion of the carbon market will be critical to secure 
the resources needed. The current carbon market triggered financial flows towards developing 
countries estimated at € 4.5 billion in 2008, with 75% of the demand coming from the EU 
private sector because of the EU's emission trading system2. It should be the main channel for 
private-sector carbon finance to support mitigation activities in developing countries. This 
would leave public finance to focus in the short and medium term and beyond on adaptation, 
capacity building and technology research, development and demonstration – and on helping 
to leverage private sector investment, e.g. by covering the financing needs during early uptake 
of new technologies.  
The more the carbon market can provide, the less demand there will be on public finance. 
That is why a properly functioning carbon market with ambitious targets is so important, and 
why more advanced developing countries should follow the OECD trend and introduce cap-
and-trade systems. 
                                                 
1 See Chapter 2 of the Staff Working Document. 
2 Adapted from: The World Bank, State and trends of the carbon market 2009 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTCARBONFINANCE/Resources/State_and_Trends_of_the_Car
bon_Market_2009-FINALb.pdf. 
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2.1. Mobilising domestic finance 
Domestic private finance will constitute a large part of the necessary investments, not only in 
developed countries but also in developing countries. As a group, developing countries should 
limit the growth of their emissions to roughly 15 – 30% below business as usual by 2020. A 
major part of the necessary investment is already commercially viable – with the additional 
investment recouped via reduced energy bills. For instance, low cost energy efficiency 
measures can deliver two thirds of the potential emission reductions in the energy sector3. 
Private investment in the energy sector can be stimulated through the establishment of the 
right policy framework, including setting up emission trading systems covering key emitting 
sectors, national regulations and financial incentives. Many developing countries are already 
introducing energy efficiency standards which leapfrog old carbon intensive technologies. 
Other innovative instruments can spur private investments in developing countries. For 
instance the EU directive on renewable energy4 promotes investments in new renewable 
energy infrastructure in North Africa. 
Furthermore, many developing countries, especially the economically more advanced ones, 
have sufficient own financial resources at their disposal to stimulate the necessary domestic 
investment. Brazil, for instance, has already announced that it will carry a significant part of 
the costs of reducing emissions from deforestation. 
A large part of the funding for adaptation can also come from private households and private 
firms as it is in their own economic interest. By minimising their risk exposure they ensure 
that their private assets such as buildings are increasingly climate proof. However, the poorest 
countries, in particular least developed countries (LDCs), together with the poorest segments 
of the populations in developing countries, will not have sufficient means to invest in 
adaptation to cope with the adverse effects of climate change. They will depend largely on 
public assistance, both domestic and international. 
2.2. Making full use of the carbon market 
The international carbon market has proven to be an effective tool to leverage private sector 
investment in developing countries, while allowing developed countries to achieve their 
emission reduction targets cost-effectively. Naturally, most of the financial flows have 
benefitted those developing countries with significant emission reduction potential. To ensure 
a dynamic development of the international carbon market (as illustrated in figure 1), the 
existing Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) needs to be substantially reformed and focus 
on LDCs. In addition, for economically more advanced developing countries and highly 
competitive economic sectors, the sectoral carbon market crediting mechanism should be 
phased in after 20125. 
                                                 
3 See SEC(2009) 101. 
4 Directive 2009/28/EC. 
5 See Chapter 4 of the Staff Working Document. 
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Figure 1: Gradual development of the global carbon market 
 
Reformed CDM 
Sectoral crediting 
Emissions covered by other 
instruments 
Bilaterally linked cap 
and trade 
TIME
R
elative share of global em
issions
In moving beyond the project-based approach this new sectoral mechanism can and should 
deliver a significant scaling up of investment in low-carbon technologies in developing 
countries and take into account the capacity by developing countries to take their own actions 
in those sectors. The driving force for these investments is a robust medium-term carbon price 
in OECD countries. 
Such investments take place as a substitute for reductions in developed countries (so called 
'off-setting'). Thus procurement of offset credits cannot be counted towards the public 
financial support that developed countries pledge in addition to their reduction targets, as this 
would in effect count such offsets twice.  
It is useful, however, to identify and report offset credits as distinct financial flows towards 
developing countries. This recognition of financial flows from offset credits will need to be 
based on an assessment of the total net flows (measured in tonnes) in or out of a country and 
on average market prices. It would be desirable to base this assessment on existing reporting 
mechanisms on financial transfer to developing countries, e.g. OECD DAC reporting, instead 
of creating new independent reporting requirements. 
The international carbon market delivers multiple benefits. Establishing a carbon market with 
a 30% reduction target for the group of developed countries would cut global mitigation costs 
by about a quarter by 2020. At the same time, it would generate financial flows to developing 
countries equalling around € 38 billion p.a.6. Furthermore, the demand for offset credits is 
creating multiplier effects as it leverages substantially more carbon finance into low carbon 
development investments. 
The potential scale of the financial flows mobilised by the carbon market depends on a 
number of key architectural elements of the Copenhagen agreement. In order to promote a 
robust carbon market that delivers finance at scale in the coming years, the negotiating Parties 
need to strive for a high level of ambition of emission reduction targets from developed 
countries, take into account or retire the surplus of Assigned Amount Units from the first 
                                                 
6 See Chapter 3 of the Staff Working Document. 
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commitment period, and set ambitious starting levels for the emission reduction paths for the 
period 2013-20207. Otherwise, the supply-demand balance across all Annex I countries would 
not give rise to a carbon price. In the period 2008 to 2012, the carbon price and the financial 
flows to developing countries are largely a result of EU action – i.e. establishment of a robust 
cap for the period 2008-2020 and non-recognition of AAUs in the EU ETS. It is therefore of 
vital importance for the emerging OECD-wide carbon market to isolate linked cap-and-trade 
systems from surplus AAUs. 
2.3. Determining the scale of international public funding 
The less the carbon market delivers, the higher the demand for public finance for mitigation 
will be. However, as the size of the carbon market cannot be predicted with certainty at this 
stage, the additional demands on public finances cannot yet be determined either. This is 
indeed one of the major reasons why regular review will be needed, via the proposed High 
Level Forum on International Climate Finance (see Chapter 4).  
The amount of public finance required for mitigation is likely to rise gradually and will, of 
course, be linked to the degree of ambition of actions in developing countries. Immediately 
after the agreement in Copenhagen, it should focus mainly on capacity building, particularly 
to strengthen institutional and regulatory capacities in developing countries, and selected pilot 
actions. As of 2013, demand for international public finance is likely to rise with the 
implementation of an increasing number of robust mitigation action plans. Significant public 
finance will also have to be provided to stimulate private sector investment into research, 
development and demonstration, largely through public-private partnerships and joint 
ventures between developed and developing countries. 
For a more detailed breakdown of needs see Table 1: 
• Additional costs for developing countries in the energy and industry sectors that cannot be 
covered by the carbon market have been estimated by the Commission at around € 33 
billion p.a. in 20208. However, this predominantly represents long term low cost efficiency 
measures, most of which should be financed domestically, mainly from private sources in 
developing countries. Only a small part of these additional costs, 10 to 20%, would need to 
be funded by international public support by 2020 with a focus on the poorer developing 
countries (€ 3 to 6 billion).  
• Additional costs for reducing non-CO2 emissions from agriculture and reducing CO2 
emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD) are estimated by the 
Commission at around € 23 billion p.a.9. Public finance will be the predominant incentive 
for reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation until 2020. Especially as 
most of the mitigation potential can be found in poorer developing countries, international 
public finance can be expected to cover a larger part of the additional costs compared to 
the energy sector, i.e. 30 to 60% (€ 7 to 14 billion). To this end, the Commission has 
proposed in an earlier Communication the establishment of a Global Forest Carbon 
Mechanism10. 
• Taking these sectors together, a first estimate of global public transfers for 2020 for 
mitigation could be in the range of € 10 to 20 billion p.a. in 2020, with about one third of 
that amount in 2013. However, how much of these flows will actually materialise will 
                                                 
7 See Chapter 7 of the Staff Working Document. 
8 See Chapter 3 of the Staff Working Document. 
9 See Chapter 3 of the Staff Working Document. 
10 COM(2008) 645. 
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crucially depend on the availability and quality of low-carbon growth plans of developing 
countries and, within that context, of elaborated proposals for mitigation actions. 
• However, as outlined in the previous chapter, given the current emission reduction pledges 
of developed countries there is a real risk of much lower carbon finance flows. If 
developed countries fail to bridge the gap between their current pledges on mitigation and 
what science requires, they will come under pressure to finance additional reductions in 
developing countries. Further analysis indicates that compensating the reduction loss by 
reducing the target for developed countries from -30% to the current low end of pledges 
around -10% below 199011, would require an increase in the transfer of international public 
finance to developing countries of around € 120 billion p.a. in 202012. 
• International public funding for capacity building and cooperation for research and 
technology demonstration has been estimated at an additional € 2 – 6 billion in 2020. 
• Public funding, both domestic and international, will be an important source of finance for 
adaptation in the poorer developing countries. The UNFCCC Secretariat estimated that 
adaptation costs in all developing countries could range between € 23-54 billion p.a. in 
203013. A first estimate of global public transfers for 2020 could be in the range of € 10 - 
24 billion p.a. in 2020.  
Adaptation financing will probably originate primarily from the public sector as a 
combination of the following sources: (i) as direct budgetary outlays from contributing 
partners, and (ii) as a share of carbon market revenues (as already in the case of the 
Adaptation Fund). For adaptation funding to flow effectively, there is a need for a strategic 
integration of climate change adaptation concerns in all sectors of the national development 
strategies. Within the next few years, capacity building is likely to be required at sufficient 
scale to ensure this integration as well as to support already identified priorities in poorer and 
most vulnerable countries. 
2.4. Fast-start international public funding for 2010-2012 
In the event of an overall deal in Copenhagen which implies fast-start international public 
funding, initial contributions should concentrate  on: 
(1) financing the processes and capacity building required, for instance to develop 
mitigation actions in the context of low-carbon growth plans, emission 
inventories, and carbon markets including the sectoral crediting mechanism; 
(2) estimating the likely impact of climate change, integrating adaptation into 
national development strategies and financing priority investments. 
Moreover, the Commission considers that, taking into account identified needs and capacities, 
additional funding should be mobilised in the short term to respond to urgent and identified 
needs for the most vulnerable developing countries and in particular LDCs, small island 
developing states (SIDS) and African countries (as defined in the Bali Action Plan), including 
further strengthening disaster risk reduction capacity. This initial financial commitment 
should be progressively scaled up after 2012 as needs are quantified in the relevant national 
strategies, the capacity for implementation is built up and an agreement is reached in 
Copenhagen on an assessed scale of contributions. 
                                                 
11 See Chapter 1 of the Staff Working Document. 
12 Based on additional analysis by POLES, JRC. 
13 UNFCCC secretariat. 
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Based on estimates of the different funding needs at different stages, the amount of public 
finance needed for adaptation, mitigation and capacity building that should come from the 
developed world between 2010 and 2012 could be between € 5-7 billion p.a.14. 
2.5. Innovative financing from international aviation and maritime transport 
With regard to potential sources of finance, the Economic and Financial Affairs Council15 
highlighted that "global instruments addressing emissions in international aviation and 
maritime transport would be welcome". The use of market-based instruments to address 
emissions from these sectors worldwide has the potential to provide a significant source of 
finance in support of developing countries' mitigation and adaptation efforts. One such 
approach is cap-and-trade systems. An alternative is a levy on their emissions. 
If, for example, both sectors were subject to a cap on their emissions, the revenue from 
auctioning could be collected at the international level and thus become a significant source of 
finance for supporting developing countries mitigation and adaptation efforts. Such a 
universal contribution would correspondingly reduce the reliance on national public budgets 
and respective annual appropriation processes. 
However, one should recognise the challenges likely to be faced in establishing such a 
framework. Developing countries argue that there should be a differentiated approach to 
addressing emissions from these sectors while developed countries are concerned about 
carbon leakage due to strong competition should there be a difference in treatment between 
operators from developed and developing countries. But it is essential that a framework is 
developed at global level if these sectors are to make a meaningful contribution. A workable 
compromise could be found in making all subject to the same overall cap with full auctioning, 
while redistributing some auction revenue to developing countries' governments depending on 
their respective emissions and economic capabilities. 
2.6. Determining contributions to international public finance 
Public sources will need to be substantial and will come in different form and via different 
channels. To ensure that overall contributions add up to what is required, the Copenhagen 
agreement should include a common scale based on agreed principles to determine different 
countries' financial contributions. This will have to take into account the overall effort of each 
country including emission reduction commitments. As part of enforcement, countries that do 
not deliver on their financial commitments could for example receive fewer emission rights or 
be limited in their access to international public climate finance.  
The European Council16 set out its preferred principles for financial contributions, namely 
'ability to pay' (i.e. GDP) and 'responsibility for greenhouse gas emissions' (without prejudice 
to internal EU burden-sharing). This is similar to the approach suggested by Mexico to 
determine contributions to the “Green Fund” it has proposed. In addition, it was highlighted 
that any distribution key should be 'universal', i.e. not limited to developed countries as the 
responsibility for emissions today is shared17. A limited number of developed and 
economically more advanced developing countries account for the largest part of global 
emissions and GDP. Least Developed Countries should be exempted from any financial 
commitment. 
                                                 
14 See Chapter 5 of the Staff Working Document for further details on the scope of activities that would 
merit early support. 
15 Luxembourg, 9 June 2009, 2948th Council meeting. 
16 Brussels, 18-19 June 2009. 
17 See Chapter 6 of the Staff Working Document. 
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With respect to these parameters, the EU's share could range from around 10% (if the only 
criterion used is emissions) to around 30% (if the only criterion used is GDP at market 
prices). The actual EU contribution will depend on the relative weight given to each of the 
two criteria in the Copenhagen agreement. Giving more weight to emissions as compared to 
GDP would provide an additional incentive to cut emissions, and acknowledge early action to 
reduce emissions. However, it would lead to relatively higher contributions from major 
emitting developing countries. 
As regards fast-start funding, assuming that it is part of the overall agreement in Copenhagen, 
a share of between 10 - 30 % for the EU would lead to a range between € 0.5 – 2.1 billion p.a. 
in 2010-2012. However, given the importance of early capacity building and adaptation, the 
EU should consider whether it should be ready to increase its contribution above this range, 
scaling-up its fast start funding over the period 2010-2012. 
Between 2013 and 2020, the EU's share could rise from € 0.9 – 3.9 billion p.a. to € 2 – 15 
billion p.a., respectively, provided that Copenhagen achieves an ambitious outcome, universal 
contributions are made by all developed and economically more advanced developing 
countries, and that the global carbon market fully plays its role. 
Table 1: Estimated international annual public finance requirements over the period 2010-2020 
(2 degrees scenario), in € billion (at constant 2005 prices) 
 2010-2012 (fast start) 2013 2020 
Mitigation 1 3-7 10-20 
Energy and industry   3-6 
Agriculture and REDD   7-14 
Adaptation 2-3 3 10-24 
Capacity building 1-2 2 1-3 
Technology research, 
development and 
demonstration 
1 1 1-3 
Total 5 – 7 9 - 13 22 – 50 
3. THE EU'S CONTRIBUTION TO PUBLIC CLIMATE CHANGE FINANCE 
3.1. How the EU could contribute  
If the EU succeeds in its goal of securing ambitious commitments on mitigation, international 
public finance will be an essential part of the agreement. On top of the significant funding 
already provided to climate change as part of EU development aid, the EU will need to be 
ready to provide additional finance for the fight against climate change, in particular as from 
2013, and in accordance with the Bali Action Plan. The contribution should be ambitious and 
fair. 
The EU negotiates as one. There are strong arguments for the EU's contribution to come as a 
single, global offer. It would ensure the coherence and visibility of the EU contribution, 
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allow for defining a fair and transparent distribution of this contribution between Member 
States, permit economies of scale in the management of disbursements, and strengthen the 
EU's voice in ensuring proper implementation of an agreement. It would allow good use to be 
made of the EU's experience and the near-global coverage of existing EU development 
assistance. There would be no difference in the total scale of EU funding between the sum of 
bilateral national contributions including any contribution from the EC budget and/or a joint 
EU contribution. 
While ensuring an ambitious and fair global contribution, the EU will also need to ensure that 
this single, global offer is organized in an efficient and fair way. There are essentially three 
options, not mutually exclusive, for channelling EU funding: 
(1) Direct funding through the EU budget would be reliable and transparent. It would 
show one of the EU's key instruments giving particular priority to one of the key 
political challenges we face today. It could take advantage of well-established rules 
and procedures, offering rigorous financial control, as well as a standard key for the 
source of the funding, and would also allow the European Parliament to play its full 
role. Given the scale of the funding over the medium term, this approach would have 
clear consequences for the overall size of the budget and it would also have a major 
impact on the next Financial Framework. In this way the EU budget would adequately 
reflect the central challenge that climate change represents for the EU for decades to 
come. 
(2) Another approach would be to establish a new common Climate Fund outside the EU 
budget, funded by bilateral contributions from each Member State. This could also 
offer a clear profile for the EU, and flexibility to design an ad hoc internal distribution 
key to finance the overall EU contribution. However, such a fund would require an 
inter-governmental agreement/legal basis of its own, would be outside the Financial 
Framework and outside the Own Resources ceiling. It would share the downsides of 
funds outside the budget (low transparency, no respect of the principle of the unity of 
the budget, more difficult to ensure coherence with the other activities financed by the 
budget). Most importantly, it would deprive the EP from exercising parliamentary 
scrutiny. 
(3) A third option would be for Member States to make their own financial contributions 
directly. However, they should be clearly presented as part of the EU's single global 
offer. 
The overall financial effort for the EU and its Member States would be the same regardless of 
the choice between the above options or a combination thereof. 
Existing EU efforts should be properly taken into account, while ensuring that the principle of 
additionality is preserved as climate aspects will be mainstreamed into the next generation of 
multiannual indicative programmes, in particular under the geographical instruments in favour 
of developing countries. 
3.2. Mobilising the EU budget up to 2012  
While the main financial implications of an agreement in Copenhagen would come into effect 
as from 2013 at the earliest, a successful agreement should be accompanied by a swift 
increase in support to developing countries to prepare the transition through capacity building 
and technical assistance. This should be partly funded from the EU budget, subject to the 
availability of resources. 
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The Commission has already proposed an additional € 50 million from the Community budget 
to be devoted to fast-start activities in 2010 in the event of a successful agreement in 
Copenhagen. Comparable sums would be needed for subsequent years. Identifying 
appropriate sources for these additional funds will not be easy: remaining margins are 
extremely limited and existing programs are already under pressure. Creative solutions may 
well be needed, and the optimal mix of sources of financing would need to be assessed in the 
light of both the outcome of the Copenhagen agreement and the budgetary availabilities. 
3.3. An equitable EU contribution to a Copenhagen agreement beyond 2012  
A second phase of funding will come into play when an agreement comes into force in 2013. 
The budgetary implications of an ambitious climate agreement in Copenhagen for the EU and 
its Member States are likely to be substantial as from 2013, i.e. in the order of several billion 
Euros per year. This would raise a particular issue for 2013, for which the financial 
framework of the EU budget has already been set. From 2014, this will be an issue for the 
new financial framework, yet to be agreed. 
The responsibility for emissions today is a shared responsibility. Whereas ability to pay 
should be an important element in determining the contributions to the global effort, the 
responsibility for emissions should also constitute a central element of a fair and sustainable 
Copenhagen agreement.  
The two obvious measures to use to determine the relative burden – already widely used in 
the UNFCCC negotiations – are emissions and ability to pay (GDP). The higher the weight of 
the GDP criterion, the higher the overall EU contribution will be. If for example the overall 
international public funding contribution is €10 billion in 2013, the total EU contribution 
would be around € 1 billion if the only criterion used was emissions, and it would reach 
around € 3 billion if the only criterion used was ability to pay.  
Mechanisms might be used to adjust the burden on specific Member States. 
It should be recalled that because of the climate change and energy package, EU Member 
States will have at their disposal significant revenues from auctioning. The legislation18 set 
out that at least 50 % of these resources should be re-cycled for domestic and international 
climate change purposes. Whilst it is difficult to be precise about the future carbon price and 
therefore the size of auctioning revenues, it is estimated that if the EU was required to finance 
€3 billion in 2013 – the upper end of the scale – this would account for between 7 and 20 % of 
total auction revenues. It would therefore be well covered by the revenues flowing into 
government treasuries from climate change policies. 
4. A EUROPEAN BLUEPRINT FOR DECENTRALISED, BOTTOM-UP CLIMATE FINANCE 
GOVERNANCE 
In order to achieve the ambitious global climate change policy goals, the provision and 
disbursement of climate finance, including public finance, will have to be increased 
significantly and swiftly between 2010 and 2020. This chapter provides for a European 
blueprint for a decentralised bottom-up governance structure which is the result of intensive 
discussions with many negotiating partners worldwide and builds also on the EU's extensive 
cooperation experience19.  
                                                 
18 Directive 2009/29/EC. 
19 See Chapter 8 of the Staff Working Document. 
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For an overall governance structure to be efficient, effective, and equitable it needs to build on 
ownership, subsidiarity, coherence, transparency, accountability, rewarding performance, 
additionality and complementarity. 
For mitigation, the European blueprint foresees as key tools country-driven low-carbon 
growth plans integrating all national appropriate mitigation actions, the ex-ante technical 
review of supported actions, up-to-date central registry of all actions and financial support, 
annual emission inventories, reporting via improved National Communications, and regular 
peer reviews. The process will be supported by an independent co-ordinating mechanism.  
In addition long-term low-carbon growth plans should be presented by all countries by 2011. 
While there should be no obligation for LDCs, they should however be encouraged to move 
towards this objective in a more flexible time frame and with appropriate support. By 2011, 
the EU will also present its long-term strategy until 2050. 
For adaptation, a simplified bottom-up approach is foreseen, which calls for the gradual 
integration of adaptation into national development strategies/poverty eradication plans, in-
country regular coordination of support, regular reporting via the National Communications 
and exchange of good practice. 
The key advantage of this decentralised bottom-up approach is that it would build on existing 
institutions – reformed and strengthened as appropriate - and developing countries’ own 
structures (in line with the Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness) and avoid creating parallel 
structures. Already today, a significant number of bilateral or multilateral initiatives would be 
hampered by forcing them into a large centralised structure. A decentralised system based on 
country-driven proposals allows contributors a higher degree of discretion over the efficient 
use of their contributions and is thus likely to encourage larger contributions than could be 
expected in the case of only one major centrally managed multilateral fund. However, this 
does not exclude a complementary new fund, such as the proposed Mexican Green Fund, if it 
would add value. 
Up-to-date registry information as well as regular reporting, i.e. through annual emission 
inventories and National Communications allows the UNFCCC to identify gaps and 
imbalances in financing mitigation and adaptation actions. Addressing these gaps should be 
facilitated through an international High-level Forum on International Climate Finance 
representing public and private expertise in this area. This forum, with a balanced 
representation of decision makers from developed and developing countries and international 
financial institutions, should oversee and give political guidance to the UNFCCC funds, 
multilateral funding agents and bilateral cooperation agencies to ensure an equitable 
distribution of funding across countries and spending priorities for mitigation and adaptation. 
